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Weak states are and have always been inviting targets for the attention of 
competing great powers, especially when the weak state occupies a geopolitically 
significant position. Whether this significance is derived from access to trade routes, 
control over material resources, or other factors of strategic importance to the 
competing powers, the opportunity to bolster its position by exerting influence over 
a weak state is tempting for any power that has the means to do so. While 
competition over weak states has been a constant feature of the international 
system for centuries, nations have diversified their strategies for exerting influence 
beyond their own borders. Outright military force is still used, but states often rely 
on other means. One of the most popular and potentially most destabilizing 
strategies that states utilize is funding armed groups within the target state. These 
militant groups are often used as proxies, allowing a strong state to project influence 
in a weak state without actually going to war. This thesis will attempt to investigate 
the factors that impact the states’ choice of strategy in competition for influence 
within weak states. Specifically, it will test whether regime type influences the 
likelihood that a strong state will sponsor armed groups in a weak state where it is 
trying to exert influence.  
Examples of powers striving to exert influence over weaker states abound 
throughout history. In fact, one could argue that competition for influence 
comprises the bulk of the strategic efforts of great powers. War is relatively rare, but 
the competition for influence among great powers is constant. This phenomenon 
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has been occurring since at least the dawn of European colonialism, as European 
nations competed with each other for influence over the comparatively weak states 
of Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Perhaps the best example of this competition came 
in the nineteenth century, when the comparatively liberal British and the 
authoritarian Russian governments played the “Great Game,” competing over 
Central Asia’s crucial trade routes. The two great powers jockeyed for influence, 
Russia vying for a port on the Black Sea and Britain jealously guarding the northern 
frontier of its Indian possessions, without ever directly controlling the states of 
Central Asia. Over one hundred years later, Afghanistan’s weak central government 
is subject to the contending efforts of the US, Russia, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan 
– all trying to ensure optimal strategic returns in a weak, but geopolitically crucial 
country.  Once again, the powers competing have a diverse set of regime types, 
ranging from the democratic US to authoritarian Iran. Between the Great Game era 
and present day, there have been countless other examples of great power 
competition over weak states, whether it is Russia and Europe vying for influence 
over Eastern Europe, Cold War struggles in Asia, or more localized conflicts such as 
the competition between Ethiopia and Eritrea over Somalia. 
If the question of whether or not regime type affects a state’s influence 
exertion strategies can be answered, the implications would have significant 
academic and practical significance. Realists would expect states to determine their 
strategies for influence exertion based purely on strategic factors such as proximity 
and means, while liberal institutionalists would expect that democratic states would 
be more likely to encourage the promotion of strong institutions within weak states 
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and to attempt to bring weak states into international institutions. The results of 
this investigation will thus represent an important contribution to the ongoing 
debate between these two perennial schools of thought. Practically, if it can be 
shown that regime type has a significant effect on the likelihood that a state will 
exert influence through armed proxies, policymakers in powerful states would gain 
a greater understanding of the strategies with which they are likely to compete 
while attempting to gain influence in contested states. Moreover, if democracies are 
less likely to support disruptive armed groups, this may imply that weak states 
subject to the influence of democratic powers may in time be more likely to become 
well-functioning nations.   
This thesis will first review the existing literature on state behavior as it 
relates to influence exertion, and show how my research will make a significant 
contribution to this literature. I will then develop a theoretical mechanism to justify 
my hypotheses that democratic regimes will be less likely to fund armed groups as a 
means of influence projection, while authoritarian regimes will be more likely to do 
so. Next, I will explain my proposed methodology for testing this thesis in the 
context of three time periods in the history of Afghanistan. Then I will analyze the 
three cases themselves, examining the strategies of states competing over 
Afghanistan in an effort to find support for my hypothesis. Finally, I will conclude, 







While there is a dearth of research on the way states exert influence in 
relation to regime type, there is some literature on the different types of strategies 
that states may pursue – including democracy promotion, economic aid, and 
sponsoring violent groups as proxies. Reviewing the literature on these three 
strategies will be fruitful, as I will then be able to draw inferences about their 
possible relation to regime type. First, however, it is necessary to survey the 
literature available on the different theoretical perspectives and their proposed 
strategies for the maintenance of state power.  
 Miller lays out the main distinctions in international relations thought, 
dividing the dominant schools into four camps: offensive realists, defensive realists, 
offensive liberals, and defensive liberals. According to Miller’s typology, offensive 
realists emphasize the maintenance of hegemony as the key to preserving a peaceful 
order (and consequently a state’s power within that order). They do not believe that 
it is possible to substantially change the intent of another threat, and thus they 
would expect states to use any means possible to strengthen their power and 
mitigate threats from others, regardless of regime type. Defensive realists, in 
contrast, advocate the maintenance of a stable balance of power, and generally 
advocate abstention from the affairs of other countries while building up defensive 
capabilities. Miller emphasizes that neither camp of realists believes that 
institutions or regime types affect state intentions substantially, and thus they 
would expect states to use whatever strategy works best to further their own 
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interests regardless of regime type.1 If realists are correct, then, there would be no 
correlation between regime type and influence strategy selection. 
 Liberals disagree with realists and believe that state intentions can be 
changed through the spread of democratic and liberal institutions. Defensive 
liberals believe this is best done through the integration of states into international 
collective security institutions such as the UN or more region-specific institutions. 
Thus defensive liberals would focus on pursuing strategies that promote the 
economic and political integration of weak states into liberal institutions as the best 
way to maximize the interests of democratic states. Offensive liberals also support 
such efforts, but have less faith in their power alone and thus would prefer to 
combine them with “forced democratization” through military intervention or 
economic sanctions. Both camps of liberals would expect democratic powers to 
exert influence by promoting democratic institutions, but offensive realists might 
combine these strategies with other more aggressive strategies. 2  Armed 
intervention by the United States in Vietnam, Korea, and Iraq could serve as 
examples of these offensive realist actions. Nevertheless, these were direct military 
actions, and there is no literature dealing with the possibility that offensive realists 
could be inclined to use proxy violent groups as a strategy for influence projection, 
and my thesis will investigate this possibility. Miller’s offensive/defensive and 
realist/liberal distinctions will be helpful in analyzing the strategies that states 
might choose to exert influence, as each school of thought provides a set of 
                                                        
1 Miller, Benjamin. “Democracy Promotion Offensive Liberalism versus the Rest (of IR Theory).” Millennium 
- Journal of International Studies 38, no. 3 (May 1, 2010): 561–91. doi:10.1177/0305829810366475. 
2 Ibid. 
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strategies that states may follow.3 My study will fill a gap in the literature by 
determining whether regime type causes states to follow the strategies of one of 
these four theoretical camps more frequently.  
 One important factor in choosing influence strategies is the empirical finding 
that democracies do not fight each other (“the democratic peace”). There is a large 
body of literature on the democratic peace, in which scholars have suggested several 
causal mechanisms for this result. Bueno de Mesquita et al. argue that democratic 
leaders face a larger selectorate, and thus need to provide public goods (goods that 
benefit all citizens) to stay in power. Since victory in war is a public good, 
democratic leaders are only likely to engage in wars that they can win, while 
autocratic leaders can lose a war and still distribute spoils to their smaller 
selectorates and stay in power.4 Mousseau advances a similar argument but couches 
it in economic terms, finding that when the effect of contract-rich economies is 
controlled for, the correlation between democracies and peace goes away.5 Since the 
democratic peace means that democracies would be less likely to face a threat if the 
target state becomes a democracy, it would give democratic states a strong incentive 
to pursue strategies of democracy promotion, rather than destabilizing strategies 
such as arming militias. As mentioned above, however, states following the precepts 
of offensive liberalism may combine peaceful democracy promotion with more 
aggressive actions. Enterline and Greig examined this behavior, and found that 
                                                        
3 Ibid. 
4 Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. “An Institutional 
Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” The American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (December 1, 
1999): 791–807. doi:10.2307/2586113. 
5 Mousseau, Michael. “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy.” International Studies Quarterly 
57, no. 1 (2013): 186–97. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12003. 
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imposed democracy is correlated with both decreased regional war and increased 
economic growth. This would seem to confirm that offensive liberal states can reap 
benefits from imposing democracy. Enterline and Greig’s conclusion only held, 
however, in cases where the state in which the target state became fully democratic, 
as imposed democracies that were only weakly democratic did not see the same 
benefits.6  
 The dependent variables considered in this thesis will be the influence 
exertion strategies that states choose. The first possible influence exertion strategy 
considered is peaceful democracy promotion. The broad heading of “democracy 
promotion”, however, encapsulates methods ranging from peaceful diplomacy to 
military intervention. Since this thesis focuses on states exerting influence by 
methods other than war, we are most interested in democracy promotion by 
peaceful means.  There is a sizable literature on democracy promotion by force, but 
relatively little has been written about democracy promotion by peaceful means. In 
general, the scholarly consensus is that a state’s conversion to democracy is more 
likely to come about due to domestic factors rather than external influences.7 There 
are suggestions, though, that external factors may also play a role in the 
development of democracy. Whitehead suggests that these factors can be classified 
into three categories: contagion, or the spread of democratic ideas from nearby 
democracies, control, or the imposition of democratic practices by a third party, and 
                                                        
6 Enterline, Andrew J., and J. Michael Greig. “Beacons of Hope? The Impact of Imposed Democracy on 
Regional Peace, Democracy, and Prosperity.” The Journal of Politics 67, no. 4 (November 1, 2005): 
1075–98. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00351.x. 
7 Schraeder, Peter J. “The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a Joint 
European-North American Research Network.” Democratization 10, no. 2 (May 1, 2003): 21–44. 
doi:10.1080/714000121. 
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consent, or the internal decision to promote democracy in response to external 
incentives, such as requirements to join an organization like the European Union.8 
Although the literature that exists on democracy promotion is split on the strategy’s 
efficacy, it does suggest that democracies, supplemented by the NGOS and the 
international organizations that they support, would be most likely to use this 
strategy.9  
 Another possible strategy for influence exertion is foreign aid. There is 
substantial literature on foreign aid, but most of it focuses on the recipient states 
rather than donor states. If democratic states hope to use foreign aid to promote 
democratic behavior in recipient states, however, the literature shows that these 
attempts are empirically likely to fail. Knack has found that there is no correlation 
between foreign aid and democratization, while Nowak-Lehmann et al. conclude 
that foreign aid is not correlated to an increase in exports to donor countries.10 
Sullivan et al. have even shown that US foreign aid and recipient state cooperation 
are inversely related.11 Even conditional aid is questionable, as Montinola finds that 
foreign aid conditionality only has an effect on recipient state action when the 
recipient state is already democratic.12 We would expect that states pursuing 
                                                        
8 Whitehead, Laurence. The International Dimensions of Democratization. Oxford University Press, 2001. 
http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199243751.001.0001/acprof-9780199243754. 
 
9 Schraeder, Peter J. 
10 Knack, Stephen. “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 
(2004): 251–66. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00299.x. See also: Nowak-
Lehmann, Felicitas, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Dierk Herzer, Stephan Klasen, and Adriana 
Cardozo. “Does Foreign Aid Promote Recipient Exports to Donor Countries?” Review of World 
Economics 149, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 505–35. doi:10.1007/s10290-013-0155-4. 
11 Sullivan, Patricia L., Brock F. Tessman, and Xiaojun Li. “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation.” 
Foreign Policy Analysis 7, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 275–94. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00138.x. 
12 Montinola, Gabriella R. “When Does Aid Conditionality Work?” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 45, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 358–82. doi:10.1007/s12116-010-9068-6. 
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defensive liberal strategies would be most likely to use foreign aid, although states 
following realist strategies could use conditional aid as well in order to coerce 
states. The literature suggests that foreign aid is a futile strategy either way. 
Nevertheless, states continue to use it, and as the literature sheds little light on 
whether the choice to donate foreign aid is correlated with regime type in the donor 
state, foreign aid could be a fruitful area for further research. 
 The final strategy that states may pursue is arming extremist groups in hopes 
of influencing affairs in a target weak state.  Violent groups are often used to 
conduct proxy wars, and they have the potential to both destabilize target states and 
draw outside powers into conflict with each other. These realities make funding 
armed groups the strategy with the most dire policy consequences, and as such the 
strategy that I will be focusing on in this thesis. Although most examples of this 
strategy’s use in the present day come from autocracies or mixed regimes (Iran and 
Pakistan being two prime examples), the literature suggests that this correlation 
may be due to environmental factors rather than regime type. Yeisley points out 
that the US, a democracy, funded armed groups during the cold war and suggests 
that proxy warfare may be a feature of bipolar systems where the cost of all-out war 
is too high for either power to undertake.13 Conrad finds that states engaged in 
enduring rivalries are more likely to be victims of state-sponsored terrorism, 
suggesting that the choice to fund extremist groups may stem from strategic factors 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
13 Yeisley, Mark O. “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 5, no. 4 
(2011): 75+. 
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rather than regime type.14 While we might expect realists to be more likely to arm 
extremist proxies, the literature suggests that the decision to do so is more 
dependent on situational factors than regime type. To date, there is no literature 
explicitly testing whether regime type influences a state’s propensity to fund armed 
groups in order to project influence, and as such my thesis will address a gap in the 
literature.   
 Overall, there little literature connecting regime type and influence exertion 
strategies, but the inferences from the literature on specific strategies suggests that 
there may not be a correlation. However, liberal theories of international relations 
would suggest that democratic states would endeavor to promote democracy in 
weak states. This is complicated, however, by the fact that countries pursuing 
offensive liberal strategies may also engage in military intervention as a form of 
democracy promotion. This literature review thus suggests that the two main tasks 
of this thesis will be to control for the effect of situational variables on strategy 
selection and to determine whether regime type causes states to pursue strategies 
more in line with a certain theoretical school of thought. If the thesis can determine 
whether regime type influences a state’s propensity to fund armed groups while 





                                                        
14 Conrad, Justin. “Interstate Rivalry and Terrorism: An Unprobed Link.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, 




 In this thesis, I hypothesize that more democratic powers will be less likely to 
fund armed groups as a strategy for influence exertion, as a result of pressure to 
choose strategies that would encourage more stability, such as economic aid and 
democracy promotion. In contrast, more authoritarian regimes will attempt to exert 
influence by supporting violent proxy groups, as they are unaffected by many of the 
constraints that face a democratic regime. There are three mechanisms that could 
cause democratic regimes to eschew funding violent groups as a means to exert 
influence: international norms, self-interest, and domestic political considerations. 
 States that are more democratic tend to place more value on upholding 
international norms, as defined by institutions like the United Nations. The UN, as 
the most important international institution, plays an important role in ensuring 
that international norms favor a democratic environment. It does this through its 
structure as a democratic organization itself, by creating norms through 
international laws that promote human rights and democracy, and by actively 
promoting democracy through electoral assistance.15 The Warsaw Declaration, 
which committed signatories representing over half the world’s countries to 
promoting and strengthening democracy around the world, provides further 
evidence for the dominant place of democracy in today’s international norms.16 In 
order to keep their place as respected members of the community of democracies 
that currently dominates global norms, democratic powers have incentives to take 
                                                        
15 Schraeder, Peter J. 
16 Ibid. 
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actions that would promote democracy and avoid actions that would bring 
condemnation. Economic aid, for example, is generally accepted and encouraged by 
the international community, while sponsoring violent groups is not. Thus, 
democratic states may be less likely to support armed proxies due to a desire to 
conform to international norms. Authoritarian states, the leaders of which are less 
likely to value international acceptance as a form of gaining legitimacy since they 
are already operating outside the dominant democratic norms, may adopt strategies 
of influence exertion that are less likely to have an overall stabilizing effect.  
 Even if they are not motivated by a desire to follow international norms, 
democracies may pursue stabilizing forms of influence projection and refrain from 
funding armed groups purely out of their own self-interest. Democracies generally 
do not go to war with each other, and thus turning a weaker state into a democracy 
would reduce the chances that the weak state could become a military threat to the 
stronger state in the future. Democracies do fight autocracies, however, so an 
autocratic power would have no incentive to promote democracy out of a desire to 
avoid war with the weak state. Moreover, encouraging economic development and 
open institutions may set the weak state on a path to joining the international 
system of free trade. Milner and Kubota have found that democratization of a 
government reduces the ability of a government to erect trade barriers, leading to 
an empirical correlation between democracy and trade openness.17  Therefore, the 
promotion of democratic, stable economies in weak states could open new markets 
                                                        
17 Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the 
Developing Countries.” International Organization 59, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 107–43. 
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and thus enhance the economic prospects of powerful democracies. Overall, 
encouraging the growth of a stable democracy in a weak state may turn the weak 
state into an ally and trading partner, both of which would be beneficial for strong 
democracies. Perpetuating conflict inside a country via support for armed proxies 
would be detrimental to these goals, and thus self-interest may drive democracies to 
avoid this strategy. Authoritarian states, in contrast, are less likely to reap the 
benefits of a stable environment in the weak state, as they are often less engaged in 
international trade networks. In addition, autocratic leaders less likely to be 
deposed due to changes in the lives of those that they rule. Thus, their power and 
wealth are not as dependent on the success of their country as a whole. They may 
thus have less of an incentive to pursue stabilizing strategies that would benefit the 
whole country economically, preferring to focus on their own personal wealth. With 
less to gain from a stable environment, autocracies may be more likely to perceive 
funding armed groups as a viable strategy for advancing their interests. 
 Finally, leaders of democracies are more sensitive to changes in domestic 
opinion, as they have to be re-elected to stay in power. Mesquita’s selectorate theory 
helps to explain this reality. Authoritarian leaders are responsible to only a small 
selectorate, and authoritarian leaders can often stay in power with the support of a 
small winning coalition comprised of military leaders, who are less likely to be 
opposed to funding armed groups. In contrast, democratic leaders are responsible 
to a larger selectorate, and need to keep the support of a majority of voters.18 In 
order to win an election, democratic leaders often emphasize foreign policy values 
                                                        
18 Mesquita, Bruce Bueno de, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 
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of freedom and nonviolence that are likely to appeal to a large electorate. When a 
democracy funds a violent group, public knowledge of this action may cause a 
backlash, as the public perceives the leader to be breaking his or her stated 
principles and going against the ethos of the democratic nation. History shows that 
funding armed groups may be detrimental to the political prospects of the leader of 
a democracy if made public. The Iran-Contra scandal, in which the Reagan 
administration in the US was politically damaged by revelations that it had armed 
rebel groups in order to augment US influence in the weak state of Nicaragua, is a 
prominent example of this phenomenon. Cognizant of this lack of public support for 
such actions, democratic leaders may naturally tend towards more stabilizing 
strategies to assert their influence. As discussed above, authoritarian leaders are 
often less dependent on the opinion of their people for their power. Thus, 
authoritarian leaders may be less hesitant to fund armed groups as such actions 
have less impact on their chances of staying in power.  
In addition, Mesquita’s framework also predicts that authoritarian regimes 
are more likely to enter wars that they may not win, and that democracies “try 
harder” once they are in a war. This is because democratic leaders need to deliver 
public goods in the form of wartime victories in order to maintain the support of a 
majority of the selectorate. Authoritarian leaders, in contrast, merely need to secure 
enough goods from war to keep their smaller winning coalition happy, and these can 
often take the form of spoils rather than outright victory.19  Although this theory 
relates to direct use of force by states, it could reasonably be extended to the 
                                                        
19 Ibid. 
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funding of armed groups. Supporting armed groups does not generally allow a state 
to win a war outright, but it may produce either spoils or more favorable outcomes 
for a leader. Thus, authoritarian leaders may be more likely to fund armed groups in 
an effort to please their smaller winning coalition, while democratic leaders may be 
unlikely to do so because proxy armed groups cannot deliver the same public goods 
that an outright military victory can. 
 In essence, these theoretical mechanisms follow the liberal framework. It 
hypothesizes that democracies believe that it is possible to change the intent of 
other states, and thus will attempt to bolster weak states and encourage them to 
become democracies as a means of promoting their own interests. It assumes that 
regime type can influence behavior, contradicting the realist position that state 
behavior is based solely on perceptions of threat and maximization of power. Thus, 
either proving or disproving the thesis proposed above would be valuable. If I prove 
the thesis, it will lend support to liberal theories of state behavior. On the other 
hand, if I disprove the thesis, realist theories of state behavior will seem more 
accurate. 
The three causal mechanisms outlined above suggest that democratic powers 
will be more likely to try to exert influence by promoting democracy and stable 
environments in weak states. Since armed conflict is detrimental to these goals, the 
theoretical justifications above suggest that democracies will be less likely to fund 
violent groups as a means of exerting influence. In addition to destabilizing the 
target state, such activity goes against international norms and public opinion, with 
which democracies are often more concerned. In contrast, authoritarian regimes are 
 17 
less constrained by public opinion and international norms, and are often less open 
to trade, thus removing any incentive to stabilize the target state economy. This 
analysis produces my thesis: 
 






















In order to test these hypotheses, the thesis will examine a group of three 
case studies, all in Afghanistan. The country of Afghanistan has been a fairly weak 
state throughout most of history. Its strategically located position astride the trade 
routes of Central Asia has made it a bone of contention among larger powers for 
centuries. Thus, this thesis will examine three periods in Afghan history when the 
competition between great powers was particularly fierce. The three hypotheses 
above will be tested by analyzing the information available for each time period. 
Focusing on the same target state, in periods in which different great powers were 
engaged in competition, will allow me to control for factors that could otherwise 
confound the analysis. Since the target state is the same, variables such as 
geography and demographics within Afghanistan will not affect the strategies 
chosen by powerful states. The drawback of this approach is that my results will not 
necessarily be applicable beyond Afghanistan. Even as focusing on Afghanistan 
controls for other factors such as geography, it also opens the possibility that those 
same factors could produce a different result in another region. Nevertheless, given 
Afghanistan’s historical prominence as an arena of contestation and its relevance to 
policy debates today, I am confident that focusing on Afghanistan will yield useful 
results even with this caveat.   
 The first period that will be examined is the “Great Game” period in the 
nineteenth century. During this time, Great Britain and Russia competed for control 
over Afghanistan. Although neither state was a complete democracy in the modern 
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sense, Britain was certainly more democratic than Tsarist Russia. The methods used 
by these two great powers will thus be instructive and provide a meaningful test of 
the hypotheses. This period will likely prove the most difficult to measure, however, 
as it is the farthest in the past. Government records from this period will not be as 
complete, and I will thus most likely have to rely on existing historical analysis, 
supplemented if possible by official records of the time period. In addition, the 
means by which powers supported armed groups in this time period may have been 
different from the more recent case studies, and I may have to adjust my definition 
using the standards of the time. While this will be difficult, finding support for my 
hypotheses in a case so far in the past would argue for the robustness of my results.  
 Second, the thesis will examine events in Afghanistan during the 1970s, in 
the decade prior to the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan was a site for proxy Cold War 
competition between the United States and the USSR. Since the thesis is examining 
methods used by states short of war, it will focus on the period before war broke 
out, in which both states tried to influence affairs in Afghanistan. This period will 
thus provide another means to test the hypothesis, in the same environment but 
with different powers. Soviet Russia was an autocratic regime, but not the same type 
of regime as Tsarist Russia. The U.S., meanwhile, was a completely different power, 
more democratic and subject to different geographical realities than Great Britain. If 
parallels can be drawn between the strategies pursued by the U.S. and Britain, this 
will provide substantial evidence for a pattern in the behavior of democratic states. 
 Finally, I will consider the current state of affairs in Afghanistan. As the U.S. 
prepares to pull out this year, regional powers are vying for influence in the region. 
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This includes Pakistan, India, and China. These regimes run the spectrum from 
autocracy to democracy. Thus, their behavior will be an interesting test of the 
hypotheses. If the more democratic regimes pursue the behaviors predicted by the 
theory, then the hypotheses will have significant support. 




















Case Study: The Great Game, 1801-1907 
 
 In the 19th century, Afghanistan made its first appearance as one of the 
modern world’s crucial theaters of competition. As Britain and Russia, two of the 
age’s greatest powers, strove to expand their empires, it soon became apparent that 
Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia would become a flash point for potential 
conflict between the two. Situated between expansionist Russia and India, the 
British Empire’s most prized possession, Afghanistan occupied a geographically 
crucial position. It was also a land of the unknown, ruled by local kings and largely 
untouched by Western imperialism. Thus, it was almost inevitable that Russia and 
Britain would jockey for position over the critical territory. For an entire century, 
Russia and Britain vied for influence in Afghanistan, using spies, armies, and 




 Russia’s drive to expand in Asia was rooted in events that happened long 
before the first British colonizers set foot in India. In the early 1200s, Mongol hordes 
led by Genghis Khan overran the various principalities occupying modern-day 
Russia and began two centuries of brutal rule that were disastrous for the Russian 
people. It may seem preposterous to claim that events of the 1200s affected national 
policy for Russia 600 years later, but it is a consensus view among historians that 
the Mongol experience has been crucial in shaping Russia’s worldview up to the 
 22 
present day. As Peter Hopkirk put it, “rarely has an experience left such deep and 
long-lasting scars on a nation’s psyche as this (the Mongol invasion) did on the 
Russians.”20 The experience of subjugation by foreigners from the East left Russia 
with a perpetual desire to expand and stave off the possibility of such an event 
happening again, and the eventual collapse of the Mongol Empire cleared the way 
for massive expansion across the 4,000 miles of Siberia and beyond. 
 As Russia came into its own right as a world power, it began to set its eyes 
not only on Siberia, but on Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the ultimate prize – India. 
The first Russian to make a move towards this goal was Peter the Great, who sent an 
expedition to the central Asian Khanate of Khiva, with the goal of opening a path to 
India. Peter’s force was decimated by the Khan, and Catherine the Great’s designs on 
India were just as fruitless. In January of 1801, Czar Paul tried to persuade Napoleon 
to join him in a daring overland strike on India, passing through Persia and 
Afghanistan and trying to gain their allegiance along the way. A force of 2,000 
Cossacks was actually raised for this endeavor, but they had no idea how dangerous 
their route through the unforgiving high steppes of Central Asia would be. When 
Czar Paul died in March, the Cossacks were recalled.21 Still, these early Russians 
endeavors into Afghanistan, as a means to reach India, set into motion a constant 
Russian advance across Central Asia for the century to come.  
 As the century unfolded, Russia’s primary interests became in defending 
their territories in Central Asia. Their preferred method for doing so, however, was 
                                                        




to conquer another territory, thus expanding their frontiers farther and protecting 
the previously conquered territory. Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov summed 
up the Russian mindset in the “Gorchakov Manifesto” of 1864. Gorchakov argued 
that “ambition plays a smaller role in than imperious necessity (in expansion) and 
the greatest difficulty is knowing where to stop.”22 In essence, the Russians viewed 
their expansion over “savage peoples” as an Asian version of the American concept 
of “Manifest Destiny”. The Russians were civilized, and they could only assure their 
safety against uncivilized savages by further expansion.23 Although Russians would 
have certainly loved to have it, there is little evidence that after the late 18th century 
the Russians had serious designs on India. Instead, it was this inexorable logic of 
expansion that made the Russians, as the British Viceroy of India George Curzon put 
it “as much compelled to go forward as the Earth is to circle the Sun.”24 
 In Afghanistan itself, Russian expansionism gave the Russians an interest in 
keeping the country divided among smaller local chiefs. Expanding was always 
easier without a unified power to resist Russian advances. To this end, Russia 
mainly pursued strategies of pressuring Afghanistan from the outside. The “classic 
great game strategy, which the Russians were to use again and again” was to first 
send envoys bearing gifts to local rulers, then secure and alliance, and eventually 
annex them outright.25 Over the course of the century, Russia applied this strategy 
by annexing or making protectorates the Khanates of Kokand, Bokhara, and Khiva, 
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and annexing the great cities of Tashkent, and Samarkand.26 These were all Central 
Asian states, whose occupation served the duel Russian purposes of expansion and 
pressuring Afghanistan. Russia’s other powerful means of external power was its 
alliance with Persia. Russia defeated Persia in an 1826 war, and from that point 
forward Persia served as a Russian client state. Russia often supported Persian 
armies in their forays into Afghanistan, and the Persians repeatedly threatened 
Herat, a key city in western Afghanistan that commanded the approaches to India.27   
 Although it tried to pressure Afghanistan to keep the country weak, Russia 
also strove to maintain friendly relations with the government in Kabul. This was 
helpful in their endeavors elsewhere, and it also served as a useful way to keep 
pressure on the British, who repeatedly diverted resources to Afghanistan in 
response to perceived Russian diplomatic inroads. This Russian strategy usually 
took the form of intrepid Russian officers who were sent to the court of the Afghan 
Amir (ruler) in an attempt to win his friendship with gifts and offers of protection. 
The most notable of these was Captain Yan Vitkevich, who was sent to the court of 
Dost Mohammed in 1837. Although the British initially had more influence in 
Mohammed’s court, Vitkevich eventually won his favor. The Amir’s reception of 
Vitkevich angered the British to such a degree that they soon thereafter launched an 
invasion of Afghanistan to depose Dost Mohammed.28 In 1878, a similar pattern 
repeated itself as the Russians sent their General Stolietov to Kabul to negotiate a 
treaty with the Amir, Sher Ali. Again, the British took umbrage and set in motion a 
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chain of events leading to a second British invasion over Sher Ali’s refusal to 
apologize for hosting Stolietov. In both cases, the Russians recalled their diplomats 
before hostilities broke out, but in both cases their maneuvers deftly succeeded in 
provoking the British to invade Afghanistan out of fear of increased Russian 
influence.29 Although provoking the British may not have been an intentional 
Russian strategy, both wars caused the British to expend huge amounts of 




 We have seen how the Russian expansionist drive in Central Asia was rooted 
in history that had nothing to do with the British presence in India. From the British 
perspective, however, things looked very different. By 1800, the British East India 
Company had basically consolidated its hold over India, and the subcontinent was 
the most valued possession in Britain’s vast empire. As such, any threats to India 
were of vital concern to British interests. The first time that another imperial power 
threatened India it was France, not Russia, that was the object of concern. In 1797, 
Napoleon invaded Egypt, threatening to continue on to India once he had succeeded 
there. Although this invasion came to nothing, it alarmed the leaders of British India 
and caused them to focus on their own defense.30 
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 Until 1815, no British thinkers really saw Russian expansion in Asia as a 
cause for alarm, and certainly not as a threat to India.31  As the 1820s progressed, 
however, the Russians defeated the Persians in the 1826 war, and signed the Treaty 
of Adrianople with Turkey in 1829, giving Russia a dominant position in the Near 
East. Given these Russian advances, a growing school of thought in Britain raised the 
alarm about Russian expansion as a threat to India. As explorers mapped the routes 
from Russian possessions to India, the British became increasingly worried about 
the status of Afghanistan, through which it appeared all invasion routes would have 
to pass. Lord Ellenborough, the President of the East India Company’s Board of 
Control, summed up British fears vis-à-vis Afghanistan, asserting, “If the Russians 
once occupy Cabul (sic) they may return there with the Indus in their front, until 
they have organized insurrection in our rear, and completely equipped their 
army.”32 Ellenborough’s position illustrates another British fear of the period, 
namely that Russian advances into Afghanistan could cause Britain’s Indian subjects 
to sense weakness and revolt. 
 Britain also had larger geopolitical interests in stopping Russian expansion 
into Afghanistan and Asia more broadly. In the 1800s, Britain was expanding the 
franchise and moving towards liberal free-market capitalism, while Russia was 
brutally repressing its citizenry and closing its markets. Thus, British public 
sentiment ran against Russia, which Britons saw as the antithesis of their liberal 
society. In fact, historian John Howes Gleason has argued that as a result, “antipathy 
toward Russia… soon became the most pronounced and enduring element in the 
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(Britain’s) national outlook on the world beyond.”33 In addition to this broad anti-
Russian sentiment, Britain was motivated by the fact that Russian advances towards 
the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf would threaten Britain’s dominance of the seas, 
the condition upon which its entire strength as a maritime empire rested. Finally, 
British policymakers feared that Russian expansion would lead to a collapse of the 
weak Asian Islamic regimes, in turn igniting imperial competition over the remnants 
that would likely cause a destructive war between great powers.34 In all, Britain’s 
global position of strength, as well as her prized Indian possessions, would be 
threatened by Russian expansion into Afghanistan.  
 Accordingly, Britain’s interests in Afghanistan were twofold. First and 
foremost, Britain needed an Afghan government that was friendly to British 
interests. Second, the British had an enormous interest in bolstering the power of 
the central government in Kabul. A strong, stable state was preferable to a weak 
state splintered among local chiefs because only a strong state could effectively 
repel invasion by an outside power, namely Russia. In fact, Arthur Connolly, the first 
British officer sent to reconnoiter Afghanistan, concluded that if Afghans were 
united in hostility to an invader, “the difficulties of the march would be rendered 
well neigh insurmountable.”35 Thus, the maintenance of a strong and friendly 
Afghan state would be an effective defense for India, making the only route to the 
subcontinent all but impassable to Russia. 
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 As the century went on, two schools of thought as to how to achieve this goal 
emerged within Britain. The first was the “masterly inactivity” school, eventually led 
by Sir John Lawrence, the Governor-General of India starting in 1864. The adherents 
of this school believed that the best course would be to avoid substantial British 
ventures beyond India, letting the complex politics of Afghanistan keep Russia out 
essentially on their own. The other school, which more often dominated British 
policy, was the “forward school”. These thinkers advocated a more aggressive 
British approach, whereby Britain would control and perhaps even directly occupy 
Afghanistan. 
 Like the Russians, the British attempted to use diplomats to influence the 
Amirs of Afghanistan. Unlike the Russians, however, they more frequently resorted 
to direct military intervention in the effort to secure Afghanistan. This was first 
demonstrated in 1837, when a Russian-backed Persian army attacked the crucial 
city of Herat. The British were alarmed by this move, and formed the Tripartite 
Treaty between themselves, Ranjit Singh (the leader of the Sikh state), and Shah 
Suja, who was their chosen leader for Afghanistan. These combined forces invaded 
Afghanistan in 1838, with the aim of removing Dost Mohammed, who had accepted 
the Russian diplomat Vitkevich into his court, and replacing him with the more 
amenable Shah Suja. After the initial military success of this operation, Britain’s 
involvement became just as much a financial effort  as a military one. By 1841, the 
British were spending a million pounds a year on Afghanistan. A large part of this 
money was going to subsidize Shah Suja’s increasingly corrupt court, as well as to 
pay the Eastern Ghilzai chiefs who controlled most of the mountain passes to 
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India.36 In this way, the British were both attempting to bolster a strong central 
government in Kabul and hedging their bets by buying off local chiefs with sway 
over crucial strategic areas. 
 In 1842, an Afghan rebellion ousted the British from the country and re-
installed Dost Mohammed on the throne. Interestingly, the Russians did not appear 
to have had any direct involvement in this rebellion. By 1857, however, Britain had 
signed a friendship treaty with their old enemy, Dost Mohammed. 37  This 
demonstrated how important good relations with the Afghan Amir were, as British 
interests took precedence over historical animosity. By the 1870s, the Russians 
were advancing again, annexing states on Afghanistan’s borders. By 1878, the 
situation was becoming dire for Britain. Britain had refused to accept Russia’s gains 
at the end of the Russo-Turkish war as codified in the Treaty of San Stefano, and in 
an attempt to retaliate the Russians sent General Stolietov to press for a treaty with 
Afghanistan. Lord Lytton, the new Viceroy of India and a strong adherent of the 
“forward school”, pressed the Stolietov issue with Sher Ali (the Afghan Amir). 
Lytton’s insistence turned the matter into one of imperial pride, and eventually 
Britain demanded an apology from Ali for allowing Stolietov to visit his court, and 
the permanent recognition of a British Mission in Kabul. When it became clear thta 
no such concessions were forthcoming, the British invaded once again. The second 
Anglo-Afghan war essentially ended in a stalemate.38 Both wars, however, were 
                                                        




clear manifestations of the British need to make an ally out of the Afghan Amir, by 
force if necessary. 
 The Great Game finally concluded in 1907 when the British and the Afghans 
signed the Anglo-Russian Entente. In terms of Afghanistan, Britain essentially won 
the contest, as the two countries agreed that Britain would have control of Afghan 
internal policy, and Russia promised to stop interfering in Afghan affairs.39 No 
Afghans were present at the negotiations, so the ultimate deciding factor in this 
era’s struggle for Afghanistan was the relative strength of the two imperial powers. 
Still, as this narrative has revealed, moves made in Afghanistan affected this power 
balance, and Britain’s increased commitment of men and resources eventually 




 In terms of democratization, Britain and Russia were on divergent paths in 
the 1800s. Britain was not yet a democracy in the modern sense of the word, but it 
had an elected parliament that became more democratic as the century went on. 
The franchise was expanded in three separate reform acts throughout the century, 
and by 1884 the majority of males could vote. These measures were combined with 
the introduction of the secret ballot and anti-corruption laws that made Great 
Britain more democratic.40 Russia, on the other hand, was an absolute monarchy, 
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and in fact moved further towards repression and autocracy as the century went 
on.41  
 Despite these differences in regime type, the strategies employed by each 
country in the Great Game were remarkably similar. Both Britain and Russia sought 
the friendship of the Amir of Afghanistan by sending envoys bearing gifts and 
promises of an alliance. Russia supplemented these diplomatic overtures with 
military aggression on Afghanistan’s periphery, both directly and also by using 
Persia as a client state. Britain, on the other hand, invaded Afghanistan twice to 
ensure that the sitting Amir was sympathetic to their interests. In addition, Britain 
expended large amounts of money propping up the governments of their chosen 
Amirs. 
 Although funding armed groups in the way that the Pakistanis and the 
Americans did later in Afghanistan was not an option for the players of the Great 
Game, their behavior is still instructive. Despite being a democracy, Britain did not 
have a preference for more peaceful means of projecting its influence. Instead, it 
strove for a stable and friendly Afghanistan by any means possible, including 
military force. Russia also used its military to expand in the region, but in 
Afghanistan itself it relied primarily on outside pressure and diplomatic overtures. 
Both sides used the options available to them, and it is hard to see how regime type 
played a substantial role in the policymaking process for either side.   
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Case Study: Afghanistan, 1954-1989 
 
 The onset of the Cold War brought a new era of competition over 
Afghanistan. As the Soviet Union competed with the United States for influence and 
advantage worldwide, it was imperative that it shore up its position in its immediate 
neighborhood. The USSR sought to dominate most of the states in its immediate 
neighborhood, ensuring that they were controlled by client regimes that the Soviets 
could control. In 1956 and 1968, the Soviets proved that they were willing to use 
military force to ensure that the neighboring states of Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
stayed in their sphere of influence. By the late 1970s, Afghanistan had become the 
next neighbor of the USSR to rise to the forefront of Soviet strategic concerns. 
Although Afghanistan was also effectively a Soviet client state, political turmoil cast 
this status into jeopardy and turned Afghanistan into a prominent arena for Cold 
War competition. As the Soviets struggled to maintain their influence, the United 
States saw an opportunity to undermine Soviet power and jumped into the fray. 




 The Soviet Union had been involved in Afghanistan since its very inception.  
In 1919, in an echo of the Great Game of the previous century, the Soviets supported 
an Afghan war against the British. Once Soviet-British ties were mended, though, the 
USSR was largely uninterested in Afghanistan until 1954. In that year, the United 
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States signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan. Seeing the 
tightening of U.S.-Pakistani ties as a threat, and seeking a partner to counterbalance 
them, the Soviets turned to Afghanistan. From 1954 onward, the Soviets provided 
extensive military and economic aid to Afghanistan. By the 1960s, Afghanistan was 
completely dependent on the USSR, although the USSR had little desire to meddle in 
Afghanistan’s internal affairs as long as Afghanistan remained a loyal client state.42  
 In the 1970s, political changes began to wrack Afghanistan. These changes 
were initially in the Soviets’ favor, as in 1973 King Zahir was overthrown, and was 
replaced with by Mohammed Daoud, who abolished the monarchy and set himself 
up at the head of a left-leaning dictatorship.43 Although Daoud initially cooperated 
with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Soviet-supported 
Afghan communist party, in 1977 he came to view the PDPA as a threat and made 
preparations to eliminate the party. In response, the PDPA staged a coup d’etat, 
known as the Saur Revolution, and took power.44 On its face the Saur Revolution 
was yet another positive development for the Soviets, as it placed an explicitly 
communist party in power. Yet things quickly turned sour. The PDPA government, 
led by radical Prime Minister Hefizollah Amin, quickly implemented a program of 
land reforms that sparked resentment among many rural Afghans, who felt that 
these land reforms were being implemented without concern for their interests. 
This resentment, combined with the fact that many saw Islam as incompatible with 
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Marxism, caused a rebellion to break out. By 1979, this rebellion had become a full-
fledged revolt against the PDPA, with six rebel groups based in Pakistan fighting 
alongside an additional two hundred locally-led groups.45  
 Ever since they secured Afghanistan as a client state in 1954, the Soviets’ 
primary interest in Afghanistan had been the maintenance of a stable and compliant 
state. The 1979 rebellion threatened this interest, but the Soviet leadership was still 
determined not to commit to a military intervention as late as March 1979, when 
the Soviets told Afghan communists that they could expect aid and advice, but no 
direct military relief.46 This changed in October 1979, when Amin, the radical Prime 
Minister, murdered the more moderate President, Nur Mohammed Taraki. The 
Soviets did not trust Amin, and feared that he would cut ties with the USSR and turn 
to America.47 Amin’s takeover was the last straw, and it spurred the Soviets to 
intervene directly in December 1979. Thus, in 1979, the Soviets had three main 
goals in Afghanistan. The Soviets wanted to prevent Afghanistan from falling into 
the hands of anti-communist Muslim extremists, to save face in the international 
arena by ensuring that the communist PDPA did not fall, and to replace Amin with a 
ruler more pliable to Soviet control.48 These fell in line with the overriding Soviet 
imperative, which was to keep control of a neighboring state that would have 
threatened the USSR’s security if control was lost. KGB chairman Yuri Andropov 
summed up Soviet thinking in March 1979: “We cannot lose Afghanistan.”49 
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 Unsurprisingly, the Soviets relied heavily on propping up the existing 
government of Afghanistan as a method to achieve their goals. Between 1955 and 
1979, the USSR sent an estimated $1.265 billion in economic assistance to 
Afghanistan.50 This aid was used on a wide variety of projects, most notably 
transportation infrastructure such as roads and tunnels, and a military air base at 
Bagram. In addition to bolstering the Afghan economy, these projects were 
strategically useful for the Soviets. As Khruschev pointed out in his memoirs, “The 
highways Moscow built for Afghanistan in the 1950s were designed for military 
transport in case of war with Iran or Pakistan [both U.S. allies].”51 During the Soviet 
intervention, economic aid skyrocketed – between 1982 and1986, the Soviets sent 
$7.5 billion in economic aid to Afghanistan. Projects included crucial infrastructure 
like housing and power stations, and were supervised by thousands of Soviet 
experts. This aid comprised almost 10% of the total Soviet foreign aid budget, 
representing a significant commitment to the ability of the client government in 
Afghanistan to improve its economic situation, and thus foster stability.52 
 The Soviets also provided military assistance to the Afghan government. 
Between 1955 and 1979, military aid totaled $1.25 billion, but the Soviet 
commitment was not limited to money alone. The Soviets also sent technical 
advisers to Afghanistan, and trained Afghan officers in Soviet military academies.53 
This investment paid off – when the intervention started, the Soviets helped rebuild 
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the Afghan military. Between 1979 and 1989, the Afghan army grew from 25,000 to 
150,000 strong with Soviet help. The Soviets also assisted the Afghans in developing 
an air force, which had more than four hundred aircraft and one hundred 
helicopters.54 Again, these methods make sense in the context of the Soviet goal of 
stability, as the Soviets were attempting to help the Afghans secure the country and 
assist in the fight against the rebels. Of course, the most drastic component of Soviet 
power projection after 1979 was the Red Army, which sent 110,000 men into 
Afghanistan.55 That part of the Soviet strategy, however, is outside the scope of this 
paper, which focuses on methods short of outright warfare. 
 Although the Soviets relied mainly on assistance to the Afghan government, 
they also funded violent groups when it suited their purposes. Their main aim in 
this effort was to isolate and pressure Pakistan, which was providing safe haven and 
training to the mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. To this end, the Soviets used 
KHAD, Afghanistan’s state intelligence service, which was essentially an extension of 
the KGB. KHAD supported a Pakistani group called al Zulfiqar, whicih was led by a 
man named Murtaza. Because Zia Al-Huq (Pakistan’s president at the time) had 
killed Murtaza’s father (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto), Murtaza was furious at the Pakistani 
state and motivated to overthrow it. Al Zulfiqar’s most visible accomplishment was 
the hijacking of a Pakistani plane and the murder of a Pakistani diplomat who was a 
passenger. The KGB actively supported and advised this mission.56 Although Al 
Zulfiqar was ultimately a fairly small factor in the war, the USSR’s support for them 
                                                        




shows that they did not discount the use of armed proxies as a strategy in the 




 The US did not share the USSR’s geographical interests in Afghanistan. 
Lacking a shared border, or even a clear rationale for any geopolitical interest in 
Afghanistan, US policymakers shied away from engaging with Afghanistan through 
World War II.  America did not establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan until 
1934, and did not establish a physical embassy with a resident ambassador until 
1942. 57  In 1948, a Department of Defense report assessing Afghanistan’s 
importance in light of the new post-war environment concluded: “Afghanistan is of 
little or no strategic importance to the United States… Its geographic location 
coupled with the realization by Afghan leaders of Soviet capabilities presages Soviet 
control of the country whenever the international situation so dictates.” 58 
Essentially, going into the 1950s the U.S. had accepted that Afghanistan would fall 
into the Soviet sphere of influence, and the costs of fighting that reality were greater 
than the costs of living with it. 
   By the mid-1950s, the U.S. did have growing concerns about Soviet influence 
in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. Afghanistan, however, still did not 
play a prominent role in U.S. strategy to shore up their position in the region. 
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Instead, the U.S. cemented alliances with three other regional powers – Turkey, Iran, 
and Pakistan. In 1954, the U.S. concluded an arms deal with Pakistan, and in 1955 it 
signed the Baghdad Pact, which brought the U.K., Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan into the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) alliance. Afghanistan remained an area of 
Soviet influence, and the U.S. remained largely content with that situation. 
 The year 1979, in which the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, also brought a 
revolution in Iran (a key American ally) and the replacement of the American-allied 
Somozav regime in Nicaragua with a communist government. These shifts in the 
global picture enhanced Afghanistan’s importance to American strategy. With 
American allies falling and the Soviets on the offensive in Afghanistan, key allies like 
Saudi Arabia were beginning to rethink their allegiances. In response, U.S. 
policymakers decided that they needed to put on a “full court press”, as Reagan 
administration officials would call it, against the Soviets to avoid further shaking the 
confidence of their allies.59 The U.S. could not afford a Soviet victory in Afghanistan, 
and their overriding objective now became, as President Carter put it in his diary in 
1979, “to make this action by the Soviets as politically costly as possible.”60 
 As a result of this new mindset, President Carter moved with considerable 
rapidity to approve $500,000 in funding for weapons to arm the mujahideen rebel 
groups in Afghanistan. The first shipments of arms arrived in Afghanistan two 
weeks after the Soviet intervention began.61 Not only did the Americans provide 
assistance, but Carter put together a coalition of other nations to fund the rebels as 
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well. Saudi Arabia agreed to match each dollar of American assistance. In addition 
Pakistani Zia al-Huq was firmly committed to the resistance effort, as he feared that 
Soviet success could lead to his country being attacked jointly by the USSR from 
Afghanistan to the north and its ally India from the south. Thus, Zia was an ardent 
proponent of funding the rebels, and all the weapons actually went through the ISI 
(Pakistan’s intelligence service) before they got to the mujahideen. In the first half of 
the war, however, the coalition’s goal was merely to increase the costs of war for the 
Soviets, rather than to defeat them outright. Both the U.S. and the Pakistanis feared 
that if they were too aggressive, the USSR and India could escalate the conflict and 
attack Pakistan, setting off a possible nuclear war. Thus, their goal became, as Zia 
put it, to “keep the pot boiling but not boil over.” To this end, the U.S. gave the 
mujahideen $60 million a year between 1981 and 1983, and $100 million in 1984. 
These funds went towards purchasing Soviet-made weapons, so that if the weapons 
were found the mujahideen could claim they had captured them in battle. The CIA 
and ISI were committed to a policy of deniability and wanted their involvement to 
go unnoticed. 62 
 In the mid-1980s, the American calculus changed again. Domestically, 
bipartisan support for the war was building as Congressmen like Democrat 
Representative Charlie Wilson and Republican Senator Orrin Hatch whipped up 
political support. In Pakistan, Zia had changed his mind about his desired intensity 
of intervention for two reasons. First, after five years of fighting he was surer that 
the Soviets did not have the capability or desire to press on to Pakistan. Second, 
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India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had just been assassinated and replaced with 
her son Rajiv, whom Zia saw as much less of a threat. Thus, he pushed for the U.S. to 
send shoulder-mounted Stinger missile systems to the mujahideen in 1986. This 
represented a considerable increase in investment and would end the policy of 
deniability, as these weapons could not be obtained from the Soviets. Nevertheless, 
riding rising support for the war within Congress, Reagan approved the sale of 
Stingers in 1986, and of anti-tank missiles in 1987.63 The American financial 
commitment skyrocketed accordingly. In 1985, the U.S. gave $250 million to the 
mujahideen, in 1986, $470 million, and in 1987, $630 million.64 The objectives had 
clearly changed. Rather than simply aiming to raise the costs for the Soviets, the 
American aid was now designed to allow the mujahideen to win the war and force 
the Soviets to leave. This was spelled out quite clearly in National Security Directive 
166, which Reagan issued in 1985. The Directive states that “the ultimate goal of our 
policy is the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan,” and then proceeds to lay 
out a number of methods to reach this goal, including “improve the military 
effectiveness of the Afghan resistance.”65 As America’s goals increased in scope, so 
too did the scope of its commitment to arming the rebels. In the end, this strategy 
was successful, and the Soviets withdrew their last troops from Afghanistan on 
February 15, 1989.66 
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 The events of 1954-1989 in Afghanistan clearly do not offer any support for 
the hypothesis of this paper. In this case, the United States, a democratic power, 
relied primarily on funding armed groups as its influence exertion strategy. In 
contrast, the Soviet Union, an autocratic regime, used an extensive package of 
economic and military aid as its primary method of influence. Of course, the Soviets 
did launch an armed intervention directly, and also funded armed groups in an 
effort to achieve their objective vis-à-vis Pakistan. 
 In this era of Afghan history, it is clear that the options available and the 
likelihood that each option would achieve each power’s goals were far more 
decisive than the regime type of the power. The overriding goal for the Soviets was a 
stable Afghanistan with an easily controllable government. Thus, they poured 
economic and military aid into the government, which accomplished the dual 
purposes of giving the government tools to stabilize its own country and making the 
government beholden to the USSR. For the Americans, Afghanistan was not as 
strategically important, and thus only minimal aid was given. When the Soviets 
invaded and the country did become important, funding the mujahideen was 
essentially the only option open to the U.S. The Americans could not openly 
intervene for fear of escalation, and aid would have been fruitless as the government 
was already firmly in the Soviet orbit by the time the Americans became interested. 
Pakistan’s connections with the ISI provided a relatively easy way for the U.S. to 
influence events in Afghanistan, and they utilized this option. 
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 Moreover, events specifically disproved at least two of the causal 
mechanisms that this paper hypothesized could lead democracies to be less likely to 
fund armed groups. First, domestic political conditions in the U.S. actually favored, 
arming the mujahideen, rather than prohibiting the arming of a radical group as this 
paper had hypothesized. Although the operation was supposed to be kept 
clandestine, news of U.S. funding for the mujahideen came out in a Washington Post 
article less than a month after the program had begun. The public was thus aware of 
the program, but no limiting backlash occurred. In fact, the program was quite 
popular, especially within Congress (which was regularly briefed on it), on both 
sides of the aisle.67 Second, the paper hypothesized that international norms might 
stop democratic regimes from funding armed groups. In this case, the very opposite 
happened – the U.S. participated in an international coalition which armed the 
mujahideen, including democracies such as the U.K. and autocracies such as Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan. The U.N. did not play an active role in the conflict, but this was 
because of Russia’s veto power rather than any norm that would have prohibited 
funding the mujahideen. Finally, the third hypothesized causal mechanism—that 
democracies have incentives to create more democracies, and thus would shy away 
from creating conflict—did not seem to factor into U.S. policy at all. This is further 
confirmed by the lack of U.S. aid and democratization efforts after the Soviet pullout. 
 Overall, the evidence in this case falls strongly against the hypothesis of the 
paper. It appears that each power selected from its available options those that 
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would best serve its interests, and regime type did not seem to factor into the 























Case Study: Afghanistan, 2001-2015 
 
 Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States 
intervened in Afghanistan, starting what would become America’s longest-ever 
foreign military engagement. Although American and coalition forces struggling 
with the Taliban and other insurgents have dominated global headlines throughout 
this war, there has been another struggle raging within the country – an ongoing 
contest between neighboring powers, especially India, Pakistan, and China for 
influence in Afghanistan. At the close of 2014, NATO’s combat mission formally 
concluded.68 Without NATO, Afghanistan’s government will have to shoulder the 
responsibility of maintaining security against the continued threat of militant 
groups like the Taliban and bolstering the country’s fragile economy. This case 
study will examine the interests of each power in Afghanistan, and how the various 




 Given its location on Pakistan’s northern border, Afghanistan has been tied to 
the area that comprises Pakistan today before modern Pakistan was even founded. 
In 1839, Sir Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary of British India, and Abdur Rahman 
Khan, the Emir of Afghanistan, agreed to a border between their two countries. 
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Known ever since as the “Durand line”, the line is still used as the border between 
the two countries, but it cuts through areas inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns and 
Baloch. As a result, Pakistani leaders have argued since the country’s inception that 
Pakistan should try to reclaim the Afghan areas inhabited by Pasthuns, and 
Pakistani President Ayub Khan even argued for a federation of the two states in the 
1950s.69 Ever since the 1971 war that was so calamitous for Pakistan, Afghanistan 
has assumed even greater importance as a fallback position in the face of possible 
attacks from India, Pakistan’s enduring rival. “Strategic depth” – the ability to retreat 
and recover in the face of an Indian attack before launching a potential 
counterattack, has become a central concept of Pakistan’s national defense strategy. 
Afghanistan is the obvious choice to provide this strategic depth – it occupies space 
to the northwest, where Pakistan could fall back in case of an attack from the south 
by India.70  In an age of nuclear weapons, this strategy makes somewhat less sense, 
but it is still nevertheless a prevalent mindset among Pakistan’s top military 
leaders.71 Pakistani policymakers thus see having Afghanistan as an ally, or at least 
destabilizing Afghanistan to the point where Pakistan can exert considerable 
influence there, as imperative in order to combat a perceived existential threat from 
India. Former Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Ashfaq Kayani summed up the position 
of the Pakistani military as follows: “Strategically, we cannot have on Afghan army 
on our western border which has an Indian mindset and capabilities to take on 
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Pakistan.”72 This type of rhetoric coming from the military is extremely important, 
as most experts agree that the military by and large dominates Pakistan’s foreign 
policy, even when a civilian government is nominally in power. 
In fact, Pakistan has relied heavily on violent means in its attempts to gain 
influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s intelligence services, the ISI, play a large role in 
supporting several militant groups operating in Afghanistan. These include the 
Haqqani network, TTP (otherwise known as the “Pakistani Taliban”) and the Afghan 
Taliban itself.73 In addition, Pakistan has redirected some groups previously active 
mostly in Kashmir to fight in the Afghan theater, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba, an 
anti-Indian group with longstanding ties to the ISI. The ISI is a secretive 
organization, and thus the extent of their role is not exactly known, but U.S. 
intelligence is confident that they at least fund, equip, train, and provide safe haven 
to these groups.74 Many observers and even Taliban commanders, however, assert 
the ISI does much more than that. An LSE study found widespread 
acknowledgement among top commanders that ISI representatives sit on the Quetta 
Shura, the governing council of the Taliban, and the Haqqani network command 
council. One commander interviewed asserted, “all our plans and strategy are made 
in Pakistan and step by step it is brought to us, for military operations or other 
activities.”75 A political figure supported this assertion, going so far as to say, 
“Everything is controlled by the ISI. Without the agreement of the ISI, then the 
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insurgency would be impossible.”76 It should be noted that it is unclear to what 
extent the civilian and regular military leadership of Pakistan approves of or even 
knows about these ISI activities. Nevertheless, the actions are being taken by 
Pakistan whether the government approves of them or not, and these statements 
suggest that the ISI does indeed play a huge role in supporting and directing armed 
insurgent groups in Afghanistan.  
 The ISI has used its influence to direct armed groups to target Indian 
interests in Afghanistan, in keeping with Pakistan’s overall objective of avoiding 
what they see as encirclement by India. Most notably, attacks were carried out on 
the Indian embassy in Kabul in both 2008 and 2009, as well as on Hamid 
Guesthouse, a hotel popular with Indians in Afghanistan, in 2010. Together, these 
attacks killed almost a hundred people and may have played a significant role in 
deterring India’s reconstruction efforts, as India did not start any major new 
reconstruction initiatives between 2009 and 2011.77 Pakistan has also used its 
influence over the Taliban to enhance its diplomatic position in the region. In 
February 2010, Pakistan arrested several high-profile Taliban leaders who had been 
advocating the Taliban’s participation in peace talks with the Afghan government. 
This stroke was meant to disrupt the peace process and signal to other interested 
parties, including India, that Pakistan was able to exercise considerable control over 
how and when any peace process would move forward.78  
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 Although Pakistan has also offered economic aid, it has only spent $300 
million (less than one sixth of what India has spent), and it has funded projects in a 
much more targeted manner than India’s across-the-board spending. Most of 
Pakistan’s spending has been on transportation projects designed to connect 
Pakistan to Central Asia, as access to Central Asian energy is a strategic goal for 
Pakistan just as it is for India. Moreover, Pakistan has prevented Indian goods from 
entering Afghanistan through Pakistan, a policy clearly intended to blunt India’s 
efforts to gain economic influence in Afghanistan.79 
 While it is tempting to vilify Pakistan for using more violent methods than 
India, it should be noted that their sponsorship of violent groups appears to be 
rooted more in a lack of other options and the presence of a perceived existential 
threat than any pre-existing preference for using violent proxies. Pakistan’s GDP 
stands at approximately $237 billion, while India’s, at $1.88 trillion, is almost eight 
times as large.80 Thus, deploying economic and diplomatic assets or funding the 
Afghan government’s security forces as India has done may simply not be feasible 
financially for Pakistan. In contrast, ISI ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan date back 
at least to the Soviet invasion era, when the ISI was instrumental in the Taliban’s 
creation, and so continuing to use that influence costs Pakistan little in material 
terms.81 In fact, Christine Fair, a Georgetown Professor, testified before the U.S. 
House of Representatives that “Pakistan’s reliance on Islamist militancy, (is) the 
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only tool that it has to change India’s trajectory.”82 This situation - Pakistani leaders 
convinced that they face an existential threat from India in Afghanistan and militant 
groups as Pakistan’s only viable option for combatting that threat – creates a 
strategic logic that drives Pakistan inexorably towards sponsoring militant groups.  
   
India  
 
For India, the situation in Afghanistan is not quite as dire as it is for Pakistan. 
As it dwarfs Pakistan in geographical and economic size, population, and military 
strength, an Afghanistan aligned with Pakistan does not present the same type of 
existential threat. Nevertheless, influence in Afghanistan is a tempting prospect that 
offers a myriad of benefits for India. First, it allows India to improve its position vis-
à-vis Pakistan while providing an economic opportunity for Indian investment. As in 
Pakistan, the Indian military is concerned with Afghanistan, but this sentiment is 
also prevalent among outlets that represent the views of a wider segment of the 
population. As the editorial board of LiveMint, a prominent Indian news website, put 
it: “When it comes to Afghanistan, what Pakistan gains will only be at the expense of 
India.”83 In contrast to Pakistan, India does not have a history of military coups and 
a highly independent military, and thus foreign policy is more responsive to the 
opinions of the electorate. Therefore, advocacy by popular news outlets like 
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LiveMint for a large Indian role in Afghanistan can be an important factor in shaping 
foreign policy.   
Perhaps more importantly than its potential to counter Pakistani influence, 
Afghanistan plays an important role in India’s strategy beyond Pakistan. In terms of 
security, India would prefer a stable Afghanistan in order to eliminate a potential 
haven for terrorists planning to attack India, similarly to the U.S. Indian 
policymakers also hope that access to Afghanistan will allow them to extend their 
reach into the crucial energy resources of Central Asia. Moreover, successfully 
helping to stabilize Afghanistan would lend credibility to India’s desire to be seen as 
a responsible and important and responsible member of the international 
community and a nascent regional power.84  
 India’s activities in Afghanistan have been focused on the dual objectives of 
establishing friendly relations with the Afghan government and building that 
government’s capacity. Progress towards the first goal was hindered before 2001, 
when the Taliban was in control of Afghanistan and India refused to recognize the 
Taliban government, closing India’s embassy in Kabul and cutting off diplomatic 
relations. The election of former Afghan President Hamid Karzai in 2004, after the 
U.S.-led intervention, allowed India to make significant progress in their diplomatic 
relations with Afghanistan. Karzai’s biography predisposed him to favor India, 
because he went to university in the Indian town of Simla, and to distrust Pakistan, 
because he was convinced that the ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence services) had played a 
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role in his father’s death.85 India seized the opening created by Karzai’s election, re-
opening its embassy in Kabul and opening four other consulates. These consulates 
have provided India with an on-the-ground diplomatic presence throughout the 
country, enabling Indian diplomats to work to build political and economic ties 
between the two countries at a local level.86   
In addition to this diplomatic infrastructure, the Indian government has 
worked to cultivate personal ties with Afghan leaders, especially Karzai, who visited 
India about every six months while in power.87 These efforts bore considerable fruit, 
culminating with the signing of a Strategic Partnership agreement in October 2014. 
In the agreement, the two countries agreed “to impart a long term commitment to 
their multifaceted bilateral relations and to actively develop them in political, 
development, economic, trade, scientific, technological, and other fields in the years 
ahead.”88 While such language in diplomatic agreements is commonplace and can 
sometimes be deployed without the backing of tangible cooperation, it is telling that 
India officially elevated its relations with Afghanistan to the level of a Strategic 
Partnership. At least nominally, this puts India’s formal level of engagement with 
Afghanistan at the same level as its other “Strategic Partners”, which include 
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international heavyweights such as the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan.89 Finally, India 
has sought to use ties to Afghanistan to expand its stature beyond the bilateral 
relationship itself, most significantly by spearheading a successful effort to make 
Afghanistan a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). The addition of Afghanistan enlarged SAARC, a body that India generally 
dominates, and also raises the possibility of linking SAARC, and India by extension, 
more closely to the resource-rich countries of Cental Asia.90 India has sought first to 
strengthen its bilateral ties with Afghanistan, and then to parlay the bilateral 
relationship into gains on the Asian regional stage.  
India has also been very active on the economic and infrastructure front in 
Afghanistan, with both its government and its private companies spending billions 
on reconstruction in the country. Since 2001, India has committed $2 billion worth 
of development projects to Afghanistan, more than it has to any other country. 
These projects have ranged in size from community-level projects to high-profile 
projects like the construction of Afghanistan’s parliament building, while covering 
various sectors from education to power transmission.91 This effort has earned 
India a favorable position in the eyes of the Afghan people, with a 2009 poll showing 
that 74% of Afghans viewed India favorably, while just 8% said the same about 
Pakistan.92 In addition to currying favor with the Afghan government and people, 
many of India’s infrastructure projects have served India’s strategic aims as well. 
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Most prominently, India has helped to construct a several roads linking 
Afghanistan’s highway network to the Iranian port of Chabahar. These links are 
crucial to India’s interests, as they allow Afghan goods to reach international 
shipping lanes without using the Pakistani port of Gwadar, which was once the only 
option. This undercuts Pakistan’s influence while also allowing India greater access 
to Afghanistan’s material resources, which some have valued at $1 trillion.93 India 
has used infrastructure investments as a tool to better both its image in Afghanistan 
and its economic and strategic situation. 
Finally, India has recently increased its attempts to bolster the security 
capabilities of the Afghan government. Partly at the urging of the U.S., during much 
of the past 10 years India restrained itself from providing much direct military 
assistance to avoid stoking confrontation with Pakistan.94 As the U.S. and the rest of 
its coalition prepare to leave, however, Afghanistan has found itself increasingly 
desperate for military equipment and India has stepped in to fill the gap. Last April, 
India signed a deal with Russia whereby India will pay Russia to provide arms to 
Afghanistan. The arms sales are expected to start with small arms, but could 
eventually progress to larger equipment such as tanks and helicopters.95 This deal 
may be a harbinger of a shift from “soft” to “hard” power in Indian Afghan policy, as 
Indian policymakers become increasingly wary of the Pakistani-aligned Taliban 
gaining influence once coalition forces leave. While possibly further enhancing 
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India’s profile in the region, such a shift may also prove dangerous as it could 




 Despite sharing a border with Afghanistan, China’s interests in the country 
are significantly less extensive than India or Pakistan’s. China has no ties to any 
ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, and historically has not been involved in 
Afghanistan’s wars and internal politics, as Pakistan has.96 China is a rising power, 
however, and involvement in Afghanistan would seem like a good option for 
bolstering China’s worldwide credibility as a responsible member of the 
international community, just as India strives to do by engaging Afghanistan. Unlike 
India, however, China has significant incentives to refrain from direct military 
involvement or even weapons sales. First, China is strongly allied with Pakistan, a 
nation that the Chinese foreign minister has called China’s “irreplaceable all-
weather friend.”97 Committing troops would risk putting pressure on Pakistan and 
thus losing a key ally. China is also wary of allying itself too closely with the U.S., as it 
fears that doing so could increase the risk of terrorist attacks on China as well as 
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strengthen a potential rival in America.98China has thus supported international 
efforts to find a peace process in Afghanistan but stopping short of committing any 
troops to the country.  
Nevertheless, China has a significant interest in ensuring Afghanistan’s 
security. Most immediately, instability in Afghanistan poses a threat to China in the 
form of “East Turkistan”, a militant separatist movement in China’s Xinjiang 
province, which borders Afghanistan. The movement, which advocates a separate 
state for Xinjiang’s Uighur minority, has carried out several damaging attacks on 
China, including a suicide bombing that killed five people in Tiananmen Square in 
2013.99 East Turkistan has repeatedly threatened future attacks, making them an 
enduring threat to Chinese security. East Turkistan militants have strong ties to the 
Taliban, and during the Taliban regime in 1996-2001 East Turkistan members 
obtained shelter, funding, and training in Afghanistan. Because continued instability 
in Afghanistan strengthens the Taliban, it would in turn strengthen East Turkestan, 
exposing China to a greater threat of continued terrorist attacks from the group. In a 
wider sense, instability in Afghanistan has the potential to spill over to other 
countries, strengthening radical Islamist groups across the region and increasing 
the terrorist threat to China.100  
As a result of this situation, China’s main priority in Afghanistan is stability, 
much the same as America’s. Ideally, China would like to see Afghanistan as a 
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sovereign and independent state, with an internally peaceful and progressive 
society and good relations with its neighbors and the wider international 
community. China has publicly adopted four main strategies to achieve this goal. As 
stated in 2007 by Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, these strategies are: safeguarding 
stability and security, developing Afghanistan’s economy, promoting political 
reconciliation, and enhancing international cooperation.101  
Of these four stated strategies, China has focused mainly on developing 
Afghanistan’s economy. From 2002 to 2010, China gave $205.3 million in foreign aid 
to Afghanistan, and has pledged another $327 million in aid through 2017.102 
Chinese companies have invested a total of $10 billion in Afghanistan, making China 
the largest foreign investor in Afghanistan. The most notable project has been 
Chinese Metallurgical Corporation’s (CMC) $3.5 billion Aynak Copper Mine, the 
largest foreign investment project in China.103 The CMC has also promised to build 
steel works, railways, and a coal plant, bringing its total investment in Afghanistan 
up to $4 billion.104 The CMC is a state-owned enterprise, and as such its activities 
can in some sense be taken to represent the policy objectives of the Chinese 
government. China is deliberately encouraging its companies to invest in 
Afghanistan, both to improve China’s economic position and to bolster Afghanistan’s 
economy, in turn leading to stability. 
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Until recently, China has taken few concrete steps towards the 
implementation of its other three stated strategies for engagement in Afghanistan. 
As one of the “six plus two” countries (Afghanistan’s six neighbors plus Russia and 
America), China has participated in essentially every international effort aimed at 
achieving peace in Afghanistan. It has generally preferred to let the U.N. and other 
multilateral organizations take the lead, however.105 With the end of the NATO 
combat mission, Beijing has shown signs that it may be increasing its efforts on the 
security and diplomatic fronts. In an effort to bolster Afghanistan’s security capacity, 
China has begun training Afghan police, and is considering funding nonlethal 
security equipment as well. Diplomatically, China has taken the first steps towards a 
leading role in the political reconciliation process by receiving both Afghan 
President Ashraf Ghani and a delegation from the Afghan Taliban in China. Some 
observers think that China’s goal may be to host peace talks between the Afghan 
government and the Taliban, playing the role of mediator in the peace process.106 
This tacit acceptance of the Taliban is risky for China, as the Taliban still maintain 
ties to the East Turkistan movement. Nevertheless, China appears to be calculating 
that the possibility of peace and stability in Afghanistan is more valuable to its 
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 This time period has seen the three neighboring countries competing over 
Afghanistan that span a range of regime types. Freedom House rates India as “free”, 
Pakistan as “partly free”, and China as “not free”. 107 Of the three, Pakistan is the only 
one to explicitly fund armed groups in Afghanistan. In fact, funding armed proxies 
has been a central part of Pakistan’s Afghan strategy, while India and China have 
given no funding to armed groups at all. This result suggests no correlation between 
a nation’s regime type and its likelihood to fund armed groups. 
 Each power’s geopolitical situation and available options seem to be much 
more important factors in its selection of influence strategy than regime type. India 
and China both have strong interests in a stable Afghanistan, while at least some of 
those in charge of Pakistani policy see benefits in an unstable Afghanistan. This led 
India and China to pursue similar strategies of economic and diplomatic 
engagement, aiming to bolster the strength of the Afghan state in hopes of stability. 
Pakistan, in contrast, funded client groups with the specific aim of destabilizing the 
state in order to provide “strategic depth”. In addition, Pakistan was the only state 
with long-standing ties to militant groups in Afghanistan, and the state with the 
least resources and thus the most limited ability to pursue economic engagement. It 
appears that the decision to fund armed groups stemmed much more from a lack of 
other options and a desire for instability than from Pakistan’s status as only a partial 
democracy. 
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 This is not to say that regime type had no influence over Pakistan’s decision 
to fund armed groups. The secretive nature of the ISI and the independent power of 
Pakistan’s military ensure that hard-liners can siphon Pakistani funds to armed 
groups even if civilian leaders, who are more responsive to the people, are unaware 
of such activity. In a more democratic state such as India, this would perhaps be less 
likely. Nevertheless, in China’s authoritarian system, the government could certainly 
have funded armed groups without much fear of public backlash, and yet it chose 
not to do so. Thus the means available to each power and each power’s strategic 


















 Based on the evidence in these three case studies, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the hypothesis has been confirmed. In the Great Game, an autocracy 
and a democracy pursued similar methods for gaining influence in Afghanistan. 
Neither funded armed non-state groups, but Britain, the democracy, actually came 
closest by militarily intervening in favor of its chosen candidate for the throne. From 
1954-1989, the U.S., a democracy (albeit in cooperation with autocratic regimes 
such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), made the funding of armed mujahideen a 
cornerstone of its Afghanistan strategy. In contrast, the autocratic Soviet Union 
relied primarily on economic and military aid, coupled with direct military 
intervention. In the present day, democratic India and autocratic China have both 
based their strategies primarily on aid, while autocratic Pakistan has been funding 
armed insurgent groups. In all the case studies, national behavior was driven much 
more by each state’s interests and options than by regime type. Throughout this 
expansive swathe of history, there was very little evidence that any of the 
hypothesized causal mechanisms worked to prevent democracies from funding 
armed groups.  
 Instead, the most important factor in a state’s decision of whether or not to 
fund armed groups in Afghanistan seemed to be whether or not that state had an 
interest in stability in the country. Britain in the 19th century, the USSR in 1954-
1989, and the US, India, and China in the present day all had substantial interests in 
a stable Afghanistan. As such, all these powers pursued strategies of aid designed to 
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bolster the existing state, with the added benefit of securing the goodwill of that 
state. The three of them – Britain, the USSR, and the U.S. – also turned to direct 
military intervention to assure that a more favorable regime was in power. In 
contrast, 19th-century Russia, 1954-1989 America, and present day Pakistan all 
favored an unstable Afghanistan, mostly to make domination of the country by a 
rival power less feasible. The U.S. and Pakistan both elected to fund armed groups in 
order to promote instability. In the 19th century, Russia did not have this option in 
the form we think of today, but it did sponsor armed incursions by its client state of 
Persia aimed at destabilizing Afghanistan. These parallels suggest that a state’s 
preference for a stable or unstable Afghanistan was a far more important factor than 
its regime type in determining its influence exertion strategy.  
The conclusion that regime type has no bearing on the strategy a state will 
choose when attempting to project its power in a weaker state has implications for 
the wider body of international relations literature. This thesis has contributed to 
broader debates over state behavior, examining the liberal/realist divide from a 
different angle. Since the hypothesis has been disproved, this finding lends credence 
to the realist contention that regime type does not affect the way a state conducts 
foreign policy. The case studies seem to support the realist contention that 
democratic concerns rarely reach into the realm of foreign policy, as domestic 
politics rarely entered the foreign policy calculations of each state considered.  It 
seems, instead, that states are far more likely to craft strategy based on their 
interests. States will choose the options available to them that have the best chance 
of accomplishing their goals. While this may seem like common sense, it actually is a 
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significant strike against the liberal viewpoint that state strategies are affected by 
regime type.  
 Although this thesis has attempted answer the research question in the most 
conclusive way possible, there are certainly limitations on the conclusions that 
should be drawn from my research. Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
construct a quantitative dataset of influence exertion strategies across all cases and 
time periods, the thesis has been limited to case studies. Moreover, I have focused 
my case studies on a single country, Afghanistan. While this has the advantage of 
controlling for many variables, it also has the drawback of testing my hypothesis in 
only one geographic location. It is therefore possible that while my results may hold 
across time, they may not hold when geography changes. Another limitation on this 
analysis is that much of the data needed is not publicly available. Thus, the analysis 
has been be partially dependent on my analysis of the readily available information, 
which carries the risk that I may have misinterpreted certain actions as evidence of 
influence exertion when no such motive is present, or vice versa.  
 As this thesis is a first exploration into the subject, it opens many avenues for 
further research. One path forward would be to extend my analysis to other cases 
and other geographic areas. Perhaps a database could even be constructed based on 
my criteria to test the thesis quantitatively across all cases. In addition, other 
variables besides regime type could be used as the independent variable. It may be 
fruitful for example, to research whether economic system, power, or geographic 
proximity affects a state’s choice of influence exertion strategy. Analysis of the 
dependent variable could also be extended to include more nuances. Funding of 
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armed groups could likely be broken up into more specific subcategories. Moreover, 
other influence exertion strategies, such as foreign aid and democracy promotion, 
could be included. Since influence exertion is such a major part of state interactions, 
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